The prosecutorial success of the FMA and its impact on the private security industry
Given South Africa's international reputation for being one of the most prolific exporters of PSCs, one would expect the NCACC to have been flooded with applications from South African citizens requesting authorisation to render foreign military assistance after the FMA entered into law. Instead, less than a handful of individual PSCs and South Africanbased PMSCs have ever applied for the required NCACC authorisation. 6 Given this lack of adherence to the pre-authorisation requirements set out in the FMA, one would expect the NPA to have acted swiftly to prosecute nigeria-1843796; York 2015 http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/nigeriahires-mercenaries-to-fight-boko-haram/article23442385/. A contractor to the Nigerian army confirms that they are being hired at US$400 per day: "It is the same group of people who fought in Sierra Leone, and in Angola … he puts their ages at between 50 and 65. They aren't as fast as they used to be but they are well trained and efficient in handling weapons. If you have that knowledge you don't lose it. The things that Boko Haram have done over the past four, five years are so appalling. For once these guys are fighting the right enemy. They are on the right side. It is an opportunity for redemption … adding that Nigeria is considering hiring more." (Wallis  and  Manson  2015 https://www.ft.com/content/4cda876e-d2e8-11e4-a792-00144feab7de). 5 Hartleb 2015 http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Cape-Town-teen-girlpulled-off-flight-was-trying-to-join-ISIS. 6 Bosch, Maritz and Kimble "Mercenaries or Legitimate Actors" 61; https://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/the-need-for-an-international-code-of-conductfor-private-security-actors-in-africa. SJ BOSCH PER / PELJ 2018 (21) 4 the estimated 1.7 million-plus South African PSCs deployed abroad. 7 In reality, there have been very few instances of prosecution for contravention of the FMA -despite the fact that the FMA prohibits a wide range of activities, including the provision of equipment and "advice and training to other militaries". 8 The NPA has not successfully prosecuted any South African nationals or organisations for offering these additional services, 9 and appears to have restricted its prosecutions to only the high-profile instances of alleged mercenary activities. 10 As we detailed in "South African Private Security Contractors Active in Armed Conflicts: Citizenship, Prosecution and the Right to Work", almost without exception these cases have culminated in plea bargains and have resulted in the imposition of suspended jail terms and fines (ranging from R10 000 to R200 000). 11 Given this abysmal prosecutorial track record, it comes as no surprise that Simon Mann and Nick du Toit could so easily recruit a small army of men for their doomed Wonga coup on South African soil, 12 even after the FMA had entered into force. And when you consider that their recruits stood to earn between $1,500 (for foot soldiers) and $5,000 (for team leaders) per month, 13 the threat of these insignificant fines was probably of little real deterrent effect.
In unclear" and "ambiguous". 17 In the end, all 5 men were acquitted when it came out during cross examination that the prosecution's case was heavily reliant on evidence which had been collected unlawfully in a trap set up by the Police's Anti-Terrorism unit -a division of the Hawks. 18 The defendants were, at the conclusion of the trial, contemplating filing a civil suit against the State for their wrongful arrest and detention. 19 In handing down his judgment, Judge Mothle 20 expressed concerns about the overly expansive scope of the FMA, stating that it "was broad enough to also cover the legitimate activities of private military companies". This is the first indication from the judiciary that the plot to paint everyone employed in the PMS industry as mercenariesthrough the application of the FMA -was going to face stiff challenges before the courts. Whether the PMA will be a more successful prosecutorial instrument than the FMA, when and if it ever enters into force, will be interesting to discover. In our earlier article we focused our discussion on the administrative-law hurdles which the PMA would likely face given the unfettered discretionary powers given to the NCACC. 24 Given that the NCACC has had very few applications for authorisation to consider, it is perhaps more relevant to look more closely at the new provisions contained in the PMA, to assess whether it is ever likely to overcome the difficulties which continue to paralyse the FMA.
As we had previously suggested, the provisions in the PMA were no less draconian then those of the FMA. However, there are two notable ways in which the PMA sought to enhance the chances of the NPA's successfully prosecuting those participating in the PMS industry without the required (21) 7 authorisation. The first pertains to the definition of the term "mercenary". It is evident from the records of the parliamentary working group's discussion minutes 25 that they wanted to expand the application of the term "mercenary" to include:
… other forms of involvement in the security sector that might only destabilise states, irrespective of whether the situation rose to the level of an armed conflict and even without an armed conflict being declared. 26
The definition also included within the Act's ambit "advice, logistical support, training, security services or personnel recruitment". 27 This expanded understanding of the scope of mercenary activities does not reflect the international community's understanding of the term "mercenary" -as set out in the UN Mercenary Convention. 28 Consequently, after some careful word-craft, a South African could face prosecution as a "mercenary" under the PMA for providing supportive or financial assistance in a conflict, where private gain was shown. 29 Hypothetically this means that the NPA would be able to bring a charge for "mercenary" activities under the PMA against South Africans who not only join the IDF or ISIS, but who financially support those fighting for IDF or ISIS -if their "private gain" can be demonstrated. Exactly how the NPA intends to show that those taking up arms and financially supporting ISIS or IDF are doing so for private gain remains to be seen, since in these two instances the motive for offering support is often cited as being ideological. The PMA could also be used to prosecute those PSCs who hold South African citizenship and who have reportedly been assisting the Nigerian government with advice and training in their pursuit of Boko Haram. More alarming is the possibility that any South African company selling anything from backpacks to tents to a foreign military, or any armed group, could find themselves in the dock as a result of the new parameters of the PMA.
The PMA also augmented the prior jurisdictional scope of application of the FMA. Smarting from the difficulties faced in prosecuting those involved in the infamous "Wonga coup", those drafting the PMA increased the jurisdictional scope of the NPA's prosecutorial authority through the Whether the PMA will ever see the light of day remains to be seen, and one has to wonder why, after 9 years, it is still no closer to replacing the FMA. Whatever the official or underlying reason is, it is clear that the government's objective to restrict South African citizens from fighting for foreign causes is still very much on the agenda, and the proposed amendment to the South African Citizenship Act 88 of 1995 is testament to this.
Denying citizenship when all else fails
In "South African Private Security Contractors Active in Armed Conflicts: Citizenship, Prosecution and the Right to Work" we noted with concern the true motive behind the amendment proposed in 2010 to section 6 of the We know how our government has not been able to implement the present anti-mercenary legislation because it has overreached itself. We wonder about the justification for the proposed amendments.
To avoid the serious constitutional issues 41 which this raised, section 6(3) was re-worked to avoid this implication, and it now reads: Section 6(3): Any person who obtained South African citizenship by naturalisation in terms of this Act shall cease to be a South African citizen if he or she engages, under the flag of another country, in a war that the Republic does not support.
In the end this potential backdoor means at attempting to enforce the objectives of the FMA was also found wanting. In short, South African 
South African PSCs active abroad: has Executive Outcomes risen from the ashes?
It is widely acknowledged that the South African PMS industry, which proliferated in post-apartheid South Africa, benefitted from the bush-war expertise of the personnel who had previously served under the SANDF's special operations units. When those units were disbanded under the new democratic dispensation, the market was flooded with highly trained and readily employable personnel. South African PMSCs such as Executive Outcomes found these conditions conducive to setting up shop and were able to respond quickly and decisively to calls for their services on the continent.
Perhaps it was their success that made the new democratically elected ANC government wary of them -as a threat at domestic level, but also due to the way their activities in the region might undermine the ANC government's regional foreign policy and cause it political embarrassment. 42 It was believed that the real intent behind the drafting of the FMA was to "delegitimise the industry". 43 Despite reports that the aim of the FMA was to close down PMSCs like Executive Outcomes (EO), Barlow 44 (the founder of EO) claims that his company was in fact approached by the government and asked to comment on the draft FMA -which Barlow says they did. He remarks that many of their suggestions were in fact incorporated into the FMA. At the time EO was struggling to disassociate themselves from other PMSCs masquerading as EO. While there is no government confirmation of this little-known fact, Barlow maintains that EO was one of the first South African companies to be given a licence by the South African government to operate across Africa. which had kept a lower public profile 46 quietly moved offshore, "charter shopping" 47 for states where the domestic legislation was less draconian and where the vagaries of the NCACC were not likely to impact on them. Some resorted to operating more clandestinely -but still within the borders of South Africa. 48 Those providing legal advice or lobbying government on their behalf have reported the lengths to which these PMSCs go to hide their identities and guard the details of their involvement in the industry. 49 Ironically, the hardline stance taken in the FMA, rather than affording the government the opportunity to regulate the industry, has resulted in the industry's going underground or off-shore and effectively circumventing any government regulation. 50
As for the individual South African PSCs, they may have been forced into early retirement from the SANDF when the armed forces were re-organised -but for many of them early retirement was not financially viable. Barlow writes on his blog that his air power unit was "given kill blocks to the front and flanks of the strike force and could conduct missions in those areas" (Barlow date unknown http://eebenbarlowsmilitaryandsecurityblog.blogspot.co.za/). Cottle 2015 http://www.vocfm.co.za/will-the-anc-govt-ever-prosecute-s-africansserving-in-the-idf/; Asmal 2014 Asmal http://mg.co.za/article/2014 63 Cottle 2015 http://www.vocfm.co.za/will-the-anc-govt-ever-prosecute-s-africansserving-in-the-idf/; Asmal 2014 Asmal http://mg.co.za/article/2014 Asmal 2014 http://mg.co.za/article/2014-08-07-gaza-conflict-for-some-war-iswhere-the-heart-is. If the NPA's track record is anything to go by, however, they will at worst face insignificant fines and will doubtless be offered a plea bargain.
Conclusion
The international community, including many prolific users and suppliers of personnel to the PMS industry, 75 has focused its attention on regulating the 72 ISS 2015 https://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/are-south-africans-soft-targets-for-isisrecruitment. 73 Pretorius 2016 http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/police-were-exercisingtheir-right-by-arresting-thulsie-twins-prosecutor-20160804.
74
Anon 2017 https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/justice-safety/sas-thulsie-twinsplaced-on-us-terror-list-11281219. 75 The United Kingdom regulates the industry according to FCO 2001 FCO -2002 
